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Abstract: 
 
We examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to, i.e. subsidizing, NGOs to 
increase community participation.  We show that the introduction of such a ‘participation 
subsidy’ may reduce beneficiary welfare.  Thus, eliminating community participation from the set 
of conditions for funding an NGO may in fact benefit target communities.  We show how our 
theoretical analysis may be operationalized by applying it to data from the NGO sector in 
Uganda.  Our empirical findings appear to reject the case for providing a participation subsidy in 
that context.   
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1.  Introduction 
Community participation is often celebrated in the popular as well as academic discourse, and is 
widely viewed as a requirement for successful poverty-relief projects.  Indeed, community-based 
development has arguably become a “central tenant of development policy” (Mansuri and Rao, 
2012: ix).  Botchway notes that participation is often assumed to be “good by definition” (2001: 
135) and the term has gained “unprecedented visibility and respectability” (2001: 148), often 
represented as the “magical missing ingredient” (2001: 149) for development projects. 
 The concept proceeds from the premise that permanent improvements in living standards 
are seldom attainable without the involvement and cooperation of beneficiaries.  De Berry (1999) 
suggests that the participatory approach “credits people with the ability, even in the most extreme 
circumstances, to engage with the issues that face them”.  Accordingly, the beneficiary is to be 
given more information, responsibility and decision-making power in diverse project areas, 
including its focus, the targeting of beneficiaries, the implementation strategy, and assessment.  
 While the approach is widely considered best practice, it is not clear that it deserves these 
accolades.  Evidence on its performance is scant, and there exists a lack of thorough and 
systematic evaluations with counterfactuals.
1
  The empirical literature on community 
participation acknowledges that there may be a large gap between the idealized textbook 
representation of the concept and non-profit organizations’ experiences with it.  Case studies 
show that, for a variety of reasons, textbook benefits do not always materialize. 
 At an a priori conceptual level, the difficulty is the following.  Participatory processes are 
known to be expensive and time-intensive.  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who are 
typically the implementing agencies for development projects at the ground level, may quite 
plausibly be less than perfectly altruistic.  Thus, even if there exists the possibility of significant 
gains from community participation per se, NGOs who are self-seeking (at least to some extent) 
may divert some grant resources to their own consumption, say as higher managerial perquisites, 
including leisure, rather than expending them on increasing beneficiary participation and thus 
                                                 
1
  See Mansuri and Rao (2012) for a detailed discussion.  There are many case study reports, but because 
case studies are based on small samples that are not representative, they cannot be used to shape policy and 
to inform best practices (Isham et al., 1995).  There are only a few larger sample studies examining 
participation in infrastructure projects.  These find that there are demonstrated benefits to the community 
participation approach (Isham et al., 1995; Isham and Kahkohnen, 2002; Khwaja, 2004).  Isham et al. 
(1995) examine data from 121 rural water projects and find that community participation improves project 
outcomes.  Examining 123 infrastructure projects in the north of Pakistan, Khwaja (2004) finds a positive 
role for participation, but only for non-technical decisions.  Although causality is not conclusive, both of 
these studies go to some length to argue that the most plausible direction of causality is that participation 
influences outcome.  Isham and Kahkohnen (2002) report that effective participation is reliant on a 
community’s ability to organize and mobilize itself.   
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beneficiary welfare.
2
  A moral hazard problem therefore exists with regard to the level of 
community participation chosen by imperfectly altruistic NGOs.  Donors can seek to reduce this 
moral hazard problem, i.e., ensure greater community participation, by using their financial 
leverage.  Specifically, they can make financial payments contingent on ensuring greater 
participation, thereby, in effect, subsidizing participation.  When the level of participation is open 
to independent verification by donors at low cost, so that the participation conditionality is indeed 
enforceable, such participation subsidies will increase the extent of community participation in 
developmental projects and may conceivably reduce fund diversion to NGOs' own consumption, 
relative to the case under a common lump-sum grant to all NGOs. 
 Costs of ensuring participation are however difficult to independently assess, let alone 
verify.  Donors are unlikely to have access to the kind of detailed micro-level and village or 
community-specific information that is required to reliably estimate these costs.  NGOs 
themselves, who can indeed reliably assess these costs, have an incentive to over-report them to 
donors, so as to increase their grant revenues in case donors opt for a participation subsidy.  Thus, 
in practice, donors are likely to overshoot, i.e., subsidize participation at a rate greater than its 
marginal cost.  This will induce NGOs to increase participation to excessive, i.e. inefficiently 
high, levels.  Beneficiary welfare will fall if the extent of overshooting is sufficiently high. 
 An additional difficulty arises if some NGOs are perfectly altruistic, i.e. they divert 
nothing to own consumption.  For such NGOs, any positive subsidy rate generates excessive 
participation.  Consequently, welfare of communities served by such NGOs would fall under any 
subsidy rate whatsoever, unless the total revenue received by such an NGO happens to rise, 
relative to that under a common lump-sum grant.  Given a fixed donor budget, however, this 
would happen only if perfectly altruistic NGOs implemented greater participation under a subsidy 
than imperfectly altruistic ones.  However, there does not appear to be any obvious reason why 
this must be so if the subsidy rate at least covers the marginal cost: in that case, there is no 
financial penalty incurred by choosing higher levels of participation.  Consequently, it seems 
intuitively plausible that any subsidy that at least covers the marginal cost of participation may 
reduce the welfare of communities served by perfectly altruistic NGOs. 
Assuming, realistically, that donors cannot a priori distinguish among perfectly and 
imperfectly altruistic NGOs, the upshot of the above discussion is that an adverse selection 
problem may conceivably complicate the case for a participation subsidy even when the subsidy 
rate is relatively close (or indeed exactly equal) to the marginal cost.  Imposing such subsidy rates 
                                                 
2
  On the issue of fund diversion by NGOs to managerial consumption, see Burger et al. (2014), Aldashev 
and Verdier (2010), and Castaneda et al. (2008). 
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may increase the welfare of communities served by imperfectly altruistic NGOs, but reduce that 
of communities served by perfectly altruistic ones.  The aggregate effect on beneficiary welfare 
thus becomes ambiguous.  If the latter type sufficiently predominates, a participation subsidy may 
reduce beneficiary welfare in the aggregate even if it exactly covers the marginal cost.   
 Thus, in sum, the very use of their financial leverage by donors to reduce the moral 
hazard problem faced by selfish NGOs is likely to distort the incentives facing all NGOs and may 
additionally generate an adverse selection problem.  It is therefore not self-evident that such use 
should, in general, be expected to improve beneficiary welfare.
3
 
 The purpose of the present paper is to develop and examine this intuition, regarding the 
ambiguous nature of the relationship between donor emphasis on community participation and 
beneficiary welfare, at both theoretical and empirical levels.  We first set up a simple theoretical 
framework to motivate and organize our subsequent empirical investigation.  We consider a 
population of NGOs, which differ in the weight put on own (retained) profit, relative to 
beneficiary welfare.  The magnitude of this weight (i.e., an individual NGO’s type) is private 
knowledge: it is known only to the NGO itself.  Beneficiary welfare depends positively on both 
community participation and actual project expenditure (which is a monetary aggregate of all 
other inputs that improve the well-being of intended beneficiaries).  NGOs can increase 
participation by incurring some constant (positive) marginal cost.  Donors may incentivize costly 
community participation by providing a payment per unit of participation implemented, i.e. a 
participation subsidy at a constant rate (which at least covers the marginal cost of ensuring 
participation).  They may alternatively offer a lump-sum grant identically to all NGOs, which 
entails the same aggregate expenditure by donors. 
 We first consider NGOs which are less than perfectly altruistic, i.e., which divert positive 
amounts to their own consumption.  We show that the following holds for this class of NGOs.  
Under a lump-sum grant, more selfish NGOs will implement less community participation than 
less selfish ones, but the opposite holds under a participation subsidy.  In either case, beneficiary 
welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of selfishness of NGOs.  Furthermore, we 
characterize the exact necessary and sufficient parametric configurations under which a shift to a 
balanced budget participation subsidy from a transfer regime of lump-sum grants would induce 
every NGO in our class to reduce beneficiary welfare, regardless of the exact extent of its 
                                                 
3
  There is the additional issue of internal conflicts of interest within beneficiary communities.  While the 
literature often exhibits a tendency to romanticize poor communities as internally undifferentiated entities 
easily capable of articulating common interest and exhibiting common agency, the reality of power and 
identity schisms within such communities may make collective decisions/actions incoherent, inefficient or 
normatively problematic.  We abstract from the political economy of internal decision-making within poor 
communities in this paper.    
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selfishness.  This necessary and sufficient condition turns out to involve a particularly simple 
relationship between the subsidy rate and the marginal cost of participation.  As suggested by the 
intuitive argument outlined above, a participation subsidy increases beneficiary welfare if and 
only if its rate is not 'too much in excess' of the marginal cost: we provide an exact specification 
of this bound.  We subsequently extend the model to permit some NGOs to be perfectly altruistic: 
i.e., to divert nothing at all to own consumption, and show that, for such NGOs, any participation 
subsidy rate that at least covers the marginal cost reduces beneficiary welfare.  It follows that, in 
an NGO population with both perfectly and imperfectly altruistic NGOs, any subsidy rate that at 
least covers the marginal cost of participation may reduce beneficiary welfare in the aggregate.  If 
the subsidy rate is sufficiently in excess of the marginal cost, this would hold irrespective of the 
composition of the NGO population.  Otherwise, this would happen when the former type 
dominates in the population to a sufficient degree, as suggested by our intuitive formulation. 
 Our theoretical analysis generates a simple empirically testable necessary condition for 
the existence of a participation subsidy rate not less than the marginal cost that would improve 
beneficiary welfare.  This is essentially the requirement that, under an identical lump-sum grant to 
all NGOs, the participation level implemented should fall appreciably with the extent of an 
NGO’s selfishness.  Using a representative sample of non-profit organisations in Uganda, we 
proceed to examine whether this necessary condition holds for this sample.    
 Uganda is an interesting case to consider in this regard.  The country has a long history of 
self-help organisations dating from pre-colonial society, where strong networks existed among 
clans and family members.  However, after independence, most of these grassroots self-help 
organisations were either centralized or wiped out by the government in power.  Conditions for 
NGOs improved dramatically when Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986.  Under 
Museveni’s more tolerant regime, the NGO sector expanded rapidly, with growth partly being 
fuelled by a significant rise in unemployment, which helped to boost the attractiveness of starting 
an NGO (see Nyangabyaki et al., 2004).  This expansion however has been associated with 
increasing evidence of large scale corruption and fund diversion in the NGO sector, leading to 
more emphatic demands for regulation (see Burger et al., 2014). 
 Our necessary condition involves a parameter relating the level of participation chosen by 
an NGO to the extent of its selfishness, characterized by our theoretical analysis.  We develop a 
direct measure of an NGO’s selfishness, based on survey responses from client communities.  We 
also develop a composite measure of the extent of community participation.  Examining the 
revenue data provided by the NGOs, we find that their revenue structure is better characterized as 
a lump-sum transfer, rather than as involving a participation subsidy.  We then proceed to 
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estimate the relationship between the level of community participation implemented and the 
extent of NGO selfishness as perceived by their client communities, according to the measures 
developed by us.  We find that the condition that we have identified as necessary, for a 
participation subsidy to improve beneficiary welfare, appears to be violated by the data.  
Specifically, the level of participation implemented does not appear to be significantly related to 
NGO selfishness, as perceived by the client communities.  Thus, our empirical analysis, informed 
by our theoretical formulation, appears to reject the policy case for any participation subsidy 
whatsoever, in favour of the status quo regime of lump-sum grants, in the context of our data-set. 
 Section 2 lays out the analytical model.  Section 3 discusses our data-set, while our 
empirical results are presented in Section 4.  The final section draws conclusions. 
 
2.The theoretical framework 
We now proceed to lay out our theoretical framework.  We develop our benchmark model in 
Section 2.1 below.  We discuss theoretical extensions in Section 2.2.  Section 2.3 specifies how 
our theoretical analysis may be used to organize and illuminate empirical investigations.  
 
2.1.  The benchmark model 
Let 𝑇 be a finite set of NGOs, all of whom receive funds from a donor to implement some 
developmental project.  Consider a representative member of this set: the NGO 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇.  Let 𝜋𝑖 
represent the payoff to the NGO 𝑖, and let [𝑏(𝑝𝑖) + 𝑣(𝑒𝑖)] represent the gain to beneficiaries 
served by this NGO in the target community, where 𝑝𝑖 measures the level of community 
participation implemented, and 𝑒𝑖 is the actual expenditure on the project incurred (on all inputs 
other than community participation), by the NGO 𝑖.  Assume 𝑣(0) = 0, 𝑣′ > 0, 𝑣′′ < 0, and 
that lim𝑒→0 𝑣′(𝑒) is finite.  Assume further that the benefit to the target community from 
participation is given by the quadratic form: 
 𝑏(𝑝𝑖) = 𝐴𝑝𝑖 −
𝛽𝑝𝑖
2
2
;        (1) 
with 𝐴, 𝛽 > 0. 
 The NGO 𝑖 has a budget, 𝑅𝑖 = 𝜌 + 𝑟𝑝𝑖, where 𝜌 > 0 is some lump-sum payment to the 
NGO by the donor and 𝑟𝑝𝑖 represents NGO revenue conditional on ensuring community 
participation at level 𝑝𝑖; 𝑟, 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 0.  The NGO has to spend some amount 𝑐𝑝𝑖 on ensuring 
participation at level 𝑝𝑖: 𝑐 > 0; furthermore, [either 𝑟 = 0 or (𝑟 − 𝑐) ≥ 0].   
 Thus, 𝑟 = 0 represents the special case of a pure lump-sum payment contract between the 
donor and all NGOs, while (𝑟 − 𝑐) ≥ 0 represents the case of a participation subsidy contract, 
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whereby greater participation generates larger donor grants for an NGO, and the marginal subsidy 
at least covers the marginal cost of ensuring participation.  Net monetary benefit from community 
participation to the NGO is then given by: 
 𝑁(𝑝𝑖) ≡ (𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑝𝑖.        (2) 
 Let 𝜃𝑖 be a selfishness parameter representing the relative weight put by the NGO 𝑖 on 
retained profit, 𝑚𝑖; ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑇, 𝜃𝑖 ∈ [𝜃, 𝜃], and  0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃 < lim𝑒→0 𝑣′(𝑒) < ∞.  The NGO's utility 
is given by:  
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑏(𝑝𝑖) + 𝑣(𝑒𝑖) + 𝜃𝑖𝑚𝑖.       (3) 
Thus, NGOs may possibly vary among themselves in terms of their commitment to the 
communities they purport to serve.  A lower value of  𝜃𝑖 implies a higher commitment to the 
community, i.e. a lower level of selfishness.  The NGO maximizes its utility specified by (3), 
subject to the budget constraint: 
 𝜌 + 𝑟𝑝𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑝𝑖.       (4) 
 The idea that we seek to capture through this formulation is the following.  A donor with 
a given grant budget, say 𝐺, faces a large number of NGOs who may vary in terms of their 
selfishness, i.e., the relative weight they put on fund diversion (retained profit) vis-a'-vis the gain 
to the intended beneficiaries.  The degree of selfishness is captured by the parameter 𝜃, which 
takes values within the interval [𝜃, 𝜃] according to some cumulative distribution 𝐹(𝜃).  The exact 
degree of selfishness (i.e. the exact value of 𝜃), or equivalently the type, of an individual NGO is 
however private knowledge: a priori, it is known only to the NGO itself.  The distribution  𝐹(𝜃) 
is common knowledge.  Since the donor does not know an individual NGO's type, she offers a 
generic contract identically to all NGOs she faces (i.e., all the NGOs in the set  𝑇), which can 
either be a pure lump-sum contract (𝑟 = 0) or incorporate a participation subsidy (𝑟 ≥ 𝑐).  Given 
total grant budget 𝐺, which one of these two alternative contractual forms would generate higher 
total gain for the intended beneficiaries, i.e. a higher value of the term ∑ [𝑏(𝑝𝑖) + 𝑣(𝑒𝑖)]𝑖∈𝑇 ? 
 To answer this question, we first need to characterize the responses of NGOs to 
alternative contractual forms.  Dropping the subscript 𝑖 for notational simplicity, and rewriting (3) 
using (2) and (4), we have: 
 𝜋 = 𝑏(𝑝) + 𝑣(𝜌 + 𝑁(𝑝) − 𝑚) + 𝜃𝑚.      (5) 
From (5), we have: 
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝
= 𝑏′(𝑝) + 𝑁′(𝑝)𝑣′(𝑒),       (6)                                                                       
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑚
= 𝜃 − 𝑣′(𝑒).        (7) 
In turn, (6) and (7) yield: 
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𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑝2
= 𝑏′′(𝑝) + 𝑁′′(𝑝)𝑣′(𝑒) + (𝑁′(𝑝))2𝑣′′(𝑒);     (8) 
 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑚2
= 𝑣′′(𝑒).         (9) 
Since (recalling (1) and (2)),  𝑏′′ < 0, 𝑁′′ = 0, 𝑣′ > 0, 𝑣′′ < 0, from (8) and (9) we have:  
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑝2
,
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑚2
< 0.  Hence the NGO's maximization problem has a unique solution. 
 Recall now that, by assumption, ∞ > lim𝑒→0 𝑣′(𝑒) > 𝜃.  It is then evident from (6) and 
(7) that all NGOs must spend a positive amount on actual project expenditure (i.e. 𝑒 > 0) in 
equilibrium.  Intuitively, an NGO which actually spends nothing on projects will simply fail to 
provide any discernible physical output whatsoever.  Formally, this is built into our model by the 
assumption that 𝑣(0) = 0.  Such NGOs would find it very difficult to justify continuation of their 
funding to donors, and are likely to lose their funding.  Thus, in real-world policy contexts, 
where, typically, funds are released by donors in instalments, it appears unlikely that NGOs 
which spend nothing at all on projects will survive for any extended period.    
 For the sake of both realism and clarity of exposition, we first address NGOs for whom 
an interior solution holds, i.e., on those NGOs which divert a positive amount to self-consumption 
and choose a positive level of participation.  In practice, since NGOs typically need to pay at least 
some minimal financial compensation to even the most altruistic members of their staff, and incur 
recurring overhead costs, the former seems a very plausible minimal requirement.  Thus, in 
practice, most, perhaps even all, NGOs are likely to be less than perfectly altruistic.  The latter 
requirement is intuitively justified by the consideration that at least some minimal feedback from 
intended beneficiaries in terms of timing, location, etc. usually makes a significant difference to 
the extent to which the target community ends up actually using the services/facilities generated.
4
  
For such, imperfectly altruistic, NGOs, the following must hold. 
 
Observation 1.  Given a donor contract, consider the class of all imperfectly altruistic NGOs.  
Within this class, actual spending on projects and beneficiary welfare levels will both be lower if 
the NGO is more selfish.  Given a participation subsidy 𝑟 > 𝑐, participation will be higher if the 
NGO is more selfish; the opposite holds if the donor makes a pure lump-sum payment.  All NGOs 
                                                 
4
  Formally, the former condition must hold when NGOs are sufficiently self-seeking; i.e., when the lower 
bound on NGOs' degree of selfishness, 𝜃, is sufficiently high.It is evident from (6) that the latter condition 
must always automatically hold in equilibrium under a participation subsidy.  By (6) and (7), it will hold in 
equilibrium under a lump-sum transfer if 𝐴 > 𝑐𝜃; i.e., if the marginal product of participation (in terms of 
beneficiaries' welfare) at zero level of participation is higher than its opportunity cost. 
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will choose identical participation levels if 𝑟 = 𝑐.  Under a participation subsidy 𝑟 ≥ 𝑐, a higher 
subsidy rate implies lower beneficiary welfare for every imperfectly altruistic NGO. 
 
Proof of Observation 1.  
Assuming an interior solution in both self-consumption and participation level, from equations 
(6) and (7), we get the equilibrium conditions: 
 𝑏′(𝑝) = −𝑁′(𝑝)𝑣′(𝑒);        (10) 
 𝜃 = 𝑣′(𝑒).         (11) 
Combining the first order conditions (10) and (11), we have: 
 𝑏′(𝑝) = −𝑁′(𝑝)𝜃.        (12) 
Using (12), and recalling (1) and (2), we get: 
 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜃
= −
[𝑟−𝑐]
𝑏′′(𝑝)
=
[𝑟−𝑐]
𝛽
.        (13) 
 It follows from (13) that, when donors provide a participation subsidy  𝑟 > 𝑐, more 
selfish NGOs (those who put higher weight on retained profit) will choose higher levels of 
community participation.  If  𝑟 = 𝑐, participation levels must be identical across NGO types.  
However, in either case, as 𝜃 rises, 𝑣′(𝑒) must rise (recall (11)), so that more selfish NGOs 
choose lower levels of project expenditure.  Now recall that, from (2) and (12), 
 𝑏′(𝑝) = −(𝑟 − 𝑐)𝜃.        (14) 
Since, given 𝑟 ≥ 𝑐, (14) implies the equilibrium marginal product of participation must be non-
positive for all NGOs regardless of their type, beneficiaries must be worse off if served by a more 
selfish NGO (despite participating more when 𝑟 > 𝑐), under a participation subsidy. 
 Now consider the case where there is no participation subsidy (𝑟 = 0): NGOs only 
receive some positive identical lump-sum, 𝜌, from the donor.  Then, from (13), 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜃
=
−𝑐
𝛽
.  Since 
𝑐, 𝛽 > 0, it follows that more selfish NGOs will choose lower participation rates.  As before, (11) 
implies that more selfish NGOs will choose lower levels of project expenditure; by (14), 
therefore, beneficiary welfare will fall monotonically with the level of selfishness as well. 
Noting that, for every imperfectly altruistic NGO, project expenditure is independent of 
the subsidy rate by (11), The last claim in Observation 1 follows immediately from (14).∎ 
  
 From a policy perspective, the natural question to ask now is: which contractual form 
leads to higher aggregate beneficiary welfare?  To examine this issue, we need to compare a 
participation subsidy (𝑟 ≥ 𝑐) with a pure (and identical) lump-sum payment (𝑟 = 0) to every 
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NGO, which keeps total payment to NGOs constant.  Assume that all NGOs are in an interior 
solution under both policy regimes, so that (10) and (11) hold.  The following must then hold. 
 
Observation 2.  Suppose all NGOs in T are imperfectly altruistic under both a participation 
subsidy with 𝑟 ≥ 𝑐 and a pure lump-sum transfer.  Then, irrespective of an NGO's type, its 
beneficiaries are worse off under the former unless 𝑟 ≤ 2𝑐; its beneficiaries are better off under 
the former iff  𝑟 < 2𝑐. 
 
Proof of Observation 2.   
First notice that, by (11), the policy shift cannot alter project expenditure (𝑒).  Now let  𝑝𝐿 be the 
participation level the representative NGO would choose under the status quo pure lump-sum 
payment regime (where 𝑟 = 0).  Then, from (1) and (14), 
 𝑝𝐿 =
𝐴−𝑐𝜃
𝛽
.         (15) 
Since 𝜃 takes at most the finite value 𝜃, the lower the value of  
𝑐
𝛽
, the closer 𝑝𝐿 is to 
𝐴
𝛽
.  Let 𝑝𝑆 be 
the participation level chosen by the representative NGO under the participation subsidy regime, 
for some  𝑟 ≥ 𝑐.  Using (1),    
 𝑏(𝑝𝑆) − 𝑏(𝑝𝐿) = (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝐿)(𝐴 −
𝛽
2
(𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝐿)).     (16) 
Recall that, by (11), project expenditure is identical under the two policy regimes.  Hence,  
beneficiaries are better off under the participation subsidy iff   𝑏(𝑝𝑆) > 𝑏(𝑝𝐿).  Since (by (1) and 
(14)),𝑝𝑆 > 𝑝𝐿, it follows from (16) that: 
 𝑏(𝑝𝑆) > 𝑏(𝑝𝐿) iff [
2𝐴
𝛽
> (𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝐿)].      (17) 
Now, from (1), (14) and (15),  
              𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝐿 = 2 [
𝐴
𝛽
−
𝑐𝜃
𝛽
] +
𝑟𝜃
𝛽
.       (18) 
Combining (17) and (18) we have: 
 𝑏(𝑝𝑆) > 𝑏(𝑝𝐿) iff  𝑟 < 2𝑐; and  𝑏(𝑝𝑆) < 𝑏(𝑝𝐿) iff  𝑟 > 2𝑐.   (19) 
Observation 2 follows immediately from (19).  ∎ 
 
For an imperfectly altruistic NGO, the extent of actual spending on projects (𝑒) is uniquely 
determined by its type (recall (11)), which the donor cannot ascertain a priori.  Thus, subsidizing 
participation reduces fund diversion to self-consumption by such an NGO.  From the perspective 
of beneficiaries' welfare, therefore, the optimal strategy involves the choice  𝑟 = 𝑐, which ensures 
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the participation level, 
𝐴
𝛽
 (recall (1) and (12)), which in turn maximizes the gain to beneficiaries 
from participation.  Any subsidy rate greater than the marginal cost, c, induces excessive 
participation: the marginal benefit from participation turns negative beyond that point.   
In actual practice, donors typically cannot directly measure the cost incurred by NGOs in 
ensuring participation with any degree of reliability, because they lack the requisite local 
information.  As noted earlier in Section 1, NGOs have a financial incentive to over-report these 
costs, which is likely to impart an upward bias to donors' estimates.  Hence, in reality, donors are 
likely to overshoot (set  𝑟 > 𝑐 and thereby induce excessive participation), generating welfare 
losses for beneficiaries.  Now, by (15), without participation subsidy (𝑟 = 0), the closer the 
parameter 𝑐 is to 0, the closer an NGO's voluntary choice of the participation level is to the 
optimal level 
𝐴
𝛽
.  Hence, intuitively, the less likely it appears that donors would be able to improve 
beneficiaries' welfare by providing a participation subsidy, and therefore the stronger the a priori 
presumption in favour of a lump-sum payment to NGOs.  Observation 2 formalizes this intuitive 
understanding.  For the empirically realistic case of less than perfectly altruistic NGOs, it 
specifies the exact range within which the participation subsidy rate must lie if beneficiaries are 
not to be made worse off thereby.  The smaller the marginal participation cost, the narrower this 
range.  Thus, intuitively, the greater the likelihood that donors would end up choosing a subsidy 
rate outside this range in practice, and therefore make intended beneficiaries worse off, if they 
were to implement a participation subsidy. 
 Lastly, notice that, from (14)-(16) and (18) that: 
 𝑏(𝑝𝑆) − 𝑏(𝑝𝐿) =
𝑟𝜃2
2𝛽
(2𝑐 − 𝑟).       (20) 
By Observation 2, a participation subsidy with  𝑟 < 2𝑐 would improve the welfare of 
beneficiaries.  However, by (20), the higher the value of  𝛽, i.e. the higher the rate at which the 
marginal benefit from participation falls, the lower this gain.  Indeed, the gain may be made 
arbitrarily small, i.e. arbitrarily close to 0, by choosing a suitably high value of the parameter 𝛽.  
It follows that, even a relatively high marginal cost of participation, 𝑐, does not by itself imply 
that the gains from switching to a participation subsidy would be large: for this to happen, the 
marginal benefit from participation must fall relatively slowly as well.  The RHS of (20) is 
maximized at  𝑟 = 𝑐.  Hence, the maximum possible gain from switching to a participation 
subsidy is: 
 ∆𝑏 =
𝑐𝜃2
2
(
𝑐
𝛽
).         (21) 
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It follows from (21) that, regardless of the magnitude of the marginal cost of participation, the 
maximum possible gain from switching to a participation subsidy can be arbitrarily small: the 
parameter  
𝑐
𝛽
 simply needs to be suitably close to 0.  Conversely, a high value for the parameter  
𝑐
𝛽
 
does not, by itself, suffice to ensure that the gains from switching would be large. 
 In highlighting the centrality of the parameter 𝛽, the above analysis serves to clarify an 
issue that appears to lie at the heart of the policy discourse justifying the imposition of 
community participation conditionalities on NGOs.  The argument typically appears to be that, 
while the costs of implementing participation are significant, the gains from doing so are large 
enough to outweigh them.  However, unless incentivized by donor conditionalities, NGOs are 
likely to choose inefficiently low levels of community participation.  An assumption of NGO 
selfishness is implicit in this argument, since, as we shall show below, perfectly altruistic NGOs 
would choose the optimal level of community participation under a lump-sum grant.  Second, the 
argument requires the marginal cost of ensuring participation to be significant, since otherwise 
even imperfectly altruistic NGOs have no incentive to choose inefficiently low participation 
under a regime of lump-sum transfers.  We have incorporated this assumption in our analysis.  
The key issue however is the following: the gains from participation may be large in the 
aggregate, yet decline very sharply, and thus get altogether exhausted (in the sense of the 
marginal product of participation reaching 0) at low levels of participation.  Recalling (1), it is 
evident that a high value of the parameter A generates this possibility when conjoined with a high 
value of the parameter 𝛽.  If this is indeed the case, as our analysis shows, the participation level 
implemented even by an imperfectly altruistic NGO without any financial inducement may be 
very close to the optimal.  Hence, recalling (21), even the optimal participation subsidy would 
generate only minor welfare gains for client communities.  Conversely, an argument in favour of 
a participation subsidy implicitly embodies the claim that the gains from increased participation 
fall slowly, i.e., they remain positive even at high levels of participation (low  𝛽).  Why this 
should necessarily bethe case is however the core empirical question, which the existing literature 
does not even appear to articulate, leave alone resolve.   
 
2.2.  Extension: perfectly altruistic NGOs and partial compensation 
The theoretical case for a participation subsidy gets even more tenuous if we extend the model by 
supposing that at least some NGOs are perfectly altruistic, i.e., they are better off by diverting 
nothing to own consumption.  Formally, this can be accommodated by the additional assumption 
that, at least for some NGOs, the weight on own consumption, 𝜃, is 0.  For such NGOs, assuming 
positive participation levels, we have the equilibrium conditions (10) and: 
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 𝜃 < 𝑣′(𝑒).         (22) 
Since (10) holds, it is evident that any participation subsidy  𝑟 > 0  would reduce beneficiary 
welfare unless the NGO's total revenue is higher under the participation subsidy, relative to the 
lump-sum grant.  Notice now that all perfectly altruistic NGOs must choose identical 
participation levels and must therefore have identical budgets under the former scheme, while all 
NGOs receive identical lump-sum amounts under the latter scheme anyway.  Since the donor's 
total budgetary outlay must be identical under the two schemes, evidently, therefore, any 
participation subsidy would reduce beneficiary welfare when the NGO population consists 
exclusively of perfectly altruistic NGOs.   
 Suppose now that the NGO population consists of positive proportions of both perfectly 
altruistic and imperfectly altruistic NGOs.  Then an additional difficulty emerges with a 
participation subsidy, summarized and highlighted by the following. 
 
Observation 3.  Let the proportion of perfectly altruistic NGOs in the population of all NGOs be 
𝑛, 𝑛 ∈ [0,1].  Then, 
(i)  all beneficiaries are worse off under a participation subsidy with 𝑟 > 2𝑐, compared to a pure 
lump-sum transfer which entails identical total expenditure by the donor;    
(ii)  beneficiaries served by an imperfectly altruistic NGO are better off, but those served by a 
perfectly altruistic NGO worse off, under a participation subsidy with 𝑟 ∈ [𝑐, 2𝑐), compared to a 
pure lump-sum transfer which entails identical total expenditure by the donor. 
 
Proof of Observation 3. 
It is obvious from (10) that any participation subsidy would reduce the welfare of beneficiary 
communities served by a perfectly altruistic NGO unless such an NGO achieves a higher revenue 
under the participation subsidy, compared to what it receives under the lump-sum transfer.  We 
first show that this cannot be the case. 
 Consider a participation subsidy 𝑟 ≥ 𝑐, and let the project expenditure levels chosen by a 
perfectly altruistic NGO, F, and an imperfectly altruistic one, M, be, respectively, 𝑒𝐹 , 𝑒𝑀.  We 
first show that: 
 𝑒𝑀 < 𝑒𝐹.                                                                                                        (23) 
Suppose 𝑒𝑀 ≥ 𝑒𝐹.  Then 𝑣
′(𝑒𝑀) ≤ 𝑣
′(𝑒𝐹) , so that, by (10), 𝑏
′(𝑝𝑀) ≥ 𝑏
′(𝑝𝐹), which implies  
𝑝𝑀 ≤ 𝑝𝐹.  Since an NGO 𝑖's revenue is given by: 𝑅𝑖 = 𝜌 + 𝑟𝑝𝑖, it follows that 𝑅𝑀 ≤ 𝑅𝐹.  Now, 
𝑒𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖 = 𝜌 + (𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑝𝑖, so that: 
 (𝑒𝑀 − 𝑒𝐹) + (𝑚𝑀 − 𝑚𝐹) = (𝑟 − 𝑐)(𝑝𝑀 − 𝑝𝐹) ≤ 0. 
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Since (𝑒𝑀 − 𝑒𝐹) ≥ 0 by assumption, this implies (𝑚𝑀 ≤ 𝑚𝐹).  However, by definition, M, the 
imperfectly altruistic NGO, must spend a positive amount on own consumption (𝑚𝑀 > 0), while 
F, the perfectly altruistic one, must spend nothing (𝑚𝐹 = 0).  We therefore have a contradiction, 
which establishes (23).  Together, (10) and (23) imply: 𝑝𝑀 ≥ 𝑝𝐹, so that 𝑅𝑀 ≥ 𝑅𝐹.  Since total 
donor expenditure remains constant under the subsidy and the lump-sum schemes, this implies 
perfectly altruistic NGOs cannot have higher revenue under the former.  Hence, beneficiary 
communities served by perfectly altruistic NGOs will suffer a welfare reduction under the 
participation subsidy.  
 Recall now that, beneficiary communities facing imperfectly altruistic NGOs are worse 
off under a participation subsidy when  𝑟 > 2𝑐, but better off when 𝑟 ∈ [𝑐, 2𝑐), and that this 
holds irrespective of the income effect (Observation 2).  Observation 3 follows.  ∎ 
  
 When greater participation does not cause net financial loss (𝑟 ≥ 𝑐), imperfectly altruistic 
NGOs will choose at least as much participation as perfectly altruistic ones, thereby receiving at 
least as much revenue as the latter under a participation subsidy (indeed, strictly more if  𝑟 > 𝑐).  
Since the lump-sum contract and the participation subsidy must involve identical total 
expenditures by the donor, it follows that a perfectly altruistic NGO must receive at least as much 
revenue under the lump-sum contract, as under the participation subsidy.  Thus, the net income 
effect of any shift from a lump-sum contract to a participation subsidy with  𝑟 ≥ 𝑐 is non-positive 
for all perfectly altruistic NGOs (indeed, strictly negative if  𝑟 > 𝑐).  For perfectly altruistic 
NGOs, the substitution effect of any shift from a lump-sum contract to a participation subsidy 
creates a distortion and thereby generates a deadweight loss.  Hence, such a shift, by itself, would 
reduce the welfare of beneficiary communities served by such NGOs.  Since the income effect is 
non-positive, the overall effect must be negative as well.   
 Thus, the upshot of Observation 3(ii) is that, for the range of subsidy rates 𝑟 ∈ [𝑐, 2𝑐), an 
adverse selection problem is generated by a (balanced budget) participation subsidy.  Compared 
to a lump-sum transfer scheme which involves the same total spending by the donor, beneficiaries 
are better off under the participation subsidy if they happen to be served by an imperfectly 
altruistic NGO, but are worse off if they happen to be served by a perfectly altruistic one.  The 
aggregate impact on beneficiary welfare is therefore ambiguous, depending on the exact 
distribution of NGO types in the population.  The aggregate impact would be negative if perfectly 
altruistic NGOs predominate to a sufficient degree.       
 An analogous ambiguity arises for a subsidy rate which does not fully compensate for 
costs of ensuring participation, i.e., for 𝑟 ∈ (0, 𝑐).  It can be easily seen that such subsidy rates 
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improve beneficiary welfare, regardless of NGO type, when all NGOs are imperfectly altruistic.  
Conversely, as has been noted above, such subsidy rates reduce beneficiary welfare, relative to a 
(balanced budget) lump-sum transfer, when all NGOs are perfectly altruistic.  With a mixed NGO 
population, however, the effect becomes a priori indeterminate for perfectly altruistic NGOs.   
 To see this, first note that the substitution effect, in itself, reduces beneficiary welfare.  It 
can be shown that, when 𝑟 ∈ (0, 𝑐), imperfectly altruistic NGOs choose lower participation levels 
than perfectly altruistic ones.  Thus, a shift to a participation subsidy increases the revenue of 
every perfectly altruistic NGO: for such NGOs, the income effect is therefore positive.  Thus, the 
net effect of the shift to a participation subsidy, on welfare of beneficiary communities served by 
perfectly altruistic NGOs, becomes indeterminate sans additional assumptions regarding the 
distribution of NGO types and the form of the relationship between direct project expenditure and 
beneficiary welfare (i.e. the nature of the function 𝑣(. )).  The aggregate effect consequently 
becomes indeterminate as well.  
 
2.3.  Implications 
The theoretical considerations elucidated above suggest the following strategy for organizing 
empirical analysis.  Suppose, from data generated by a group of NGOs which do not currently 
receive any participation subsidy from donors, we empirically estimate the relationship between 
the level of community participation implemented by an NGO, and some reasonable measure of 
its degree of selfishness, in accordance with equation (15) above.  Since the degree of selfishness 
cannot be directly observed, this requires one to devise a suitable empirical proxy on the basis of 
an NGO’s observed behaviour.  Suppose further that the estimation exercise produces a 
statistically insignificant relationship.  This would lead us to conclude that 
𝑐
𝛽
≅ 0. 
Now recall that, by (20) above, the maximum possible welfare gain for beneficiaries 
served by imperfectly altruistic NGOs under a participation subsidy is attained by equating the 
subsidy rate with the marginal cost (i.e., by putting 𝑟 = 𝑐), with the magnitude of the gain given 
by (21) above.  It follows from (21) that the magnitude of the gains from any positive 
participation subsidy is negligible for beneficiary communities served by imperfectly altruistic 
NGOs if  
𝑐
𝛽
≅ 0.  On the other hand, by Observation 3, any participation subsidy that at least 
covers the cost of participation (i.e. any 𝑟 ≥ 𝑐) reduces the welfare of beneficiary communities 
served by perfectly altruistic NGOs.  It follows that, when 
𝑐
𝛽
≅ 0, no participation subsidy that at 
least covers the cost of participation and involves the same donor outlay as a lump-sum grant can 
appreciably increase beneficiary welfare in the aggregate over the latter contractual form, 
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regardless of the distribution of NGO types in the population.  Under the additional, empirically 
plausible, assumption that the proportion of perfectly altruistic NGOs is negligible, this claim 
extends to any positive subsidy rate whatsoever. 
Thus, assuming that the proportion of perfectly altruistic NGOs is negligible, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a case for a participation subsidy is a positive estimate of  
𝑐
𝛽
.  Notice however that this remains a weak case without prior knowledge of the marginal cost of 
participation: we would not be able to directly identify a welfare improving subsidy rate from the 
data, but merely argue that such subsidy rates exist.  This is so because we would not be able to 
separately estimate the value of the marginal cost of participation, c, from equation (15) alone; 
hence, we would not be able to use Observation 1 to empirically identify the interval of welfare-
improving subsidy rates, even if the population only contained imperfectly altruistic NGOs.  
Furthermore, even a high positive estimate of  
𝑐
𝛽
 would not necessarily imply large potential gains 
from switching to the optimal participation subsidy.  Equation (21) implies that a high estimated 
value of 
𝑐
𝛽
 does not, by itself, let us infer a high value for such gains (nor, therefore, their 
practical importance): this requires suitably high values for the unobserved parameter  𝑐 as well. 
 
3.  Data 
The study uses a representative 2002 survey of the Ugandan NGO sector, which incorporates two 
modules: (i) an NGO questionnaire to collect information on the organisation’s structure, finances 
and activities, and (ii) a community focus group interview to explore how the organisation is 
perceived by community members.  By capturing both community perceptions and organisational 
characteristics, the survey enables researchers to postulate links between community perceptions, 
such as the value added by the organisation, and self-reported organisational features such as the 
organisation’s size and its skilled workforce.  
The first survey module (NGO questionnaire) has a sample of 298 observations. The 
Ugandan register of non-governmental organisations was used to construct the sampling frame. It 
has 255 questions covering funding, ownership, expenditure, assets and governance.  
The data was captured at an organisational level and not at a project level. Some 
organisations claimed to not have financial information available, and in other cases where the 
information was available, the book-keeping system appeared to be unreliable. Due to the 
intricate accounting involved in allocating overheads to projects, it is expected that information 
availability and quality would have been substantially worse at a project level.  It is also likely 
that a project-level approach may not be feasible for studying Ugandan non-profit organisations 
 16 
 
due to the lack of regard for specialisation and focus within these organisations.  Barr et al. 
(2005) find that many Ugandan NGOs seem to ‘do it all’, listing a vast array of activities and 
‘focus areas’ that they are involved in.  Due to the organisation-level approach of the survey, the 
sample consequently includes a wide variety of NGO subsectors.  
The second survey module is a community focus group.  In each community visited, six 
to ten focus group participants were recruited via a community leader. Communities were 
identified by asking the NGOs surveyed to identify a number of parishes where they worked.  In 
this way, parishes were matched to NGOs.  The community focus groups collected information 
on the focus group members’ perceptions regarding poverty in their community, community 
needs, and those who help the community meet these needs.  It also asked more detailed 
questions about the perceived contribution of one specific NGO working in the parish.  Given the 
large literature on elite capture within community participation projects (see for example Ban et 
al., 2012; Platteau and Abraham, 2002) it is worth noting that to control for participant 
characteristics information was collected on a number of variables including education levels of 
the participants, their employment status and whether they were affiliated with the district office.  
The first module of the survey (NGO questionnaire) can be matched to 207 of the 268 
observations from the second module (community focus groups).  There were also cases where 
some NGOs were linked to more than one community.  To avoid problems with error terms, 28 
duplicates were eliminated randomly, reducing the sample to 186 observations.  
Barr et al. (2005), and Barr and Fafchamps (2004) provide more information regarding 
the survey questionnaire and focus group interviews respectively. 
 
4.  Empirical specification 
In light of our theoretical investigation in Section 2 above, the first step in our empirical analysis 
is to examine whether there is evidence that the NGOs in our sample face significant financial 
incentives from donors to increase community participation. 
We measure community participation by creating an index based on adding seven binary 
variables, namely whether the NGO asked the community about their needs prior to the project 
(as reported by the community), whether the NGO asked the community for feedback after or 
during the project (again reliant on community focus groups), whether the NGO manager was 
appointed democratically, whether the NGO had a physical presence in the community (reported 
by the community), whether the NGO had a membership system, whether a vote of board was 
required before adding new activities and whether host communities were involved in the actual 
delivery of services or the execution of projects.  As anticipated, there is a large degree of 
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variation across the 8-point scale of the index (Figure 1).  The variable has a mean value of 4.2 
with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 7.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
We find no evidence of a robust and positive relationship between this measure of 
community participation and the revenue of the NGOs: the correlation coefficient is -0.091 and 
not significant.  As a further check, we examined the relationship between community 
participation and grant success (for those NGOs that applied for grants) and found no evidence of 
a significant positive relationship.  This also holds true when we limit our sample only to NGOs 
that have grants or that have received grants in the past.  Contrary to what we would have 
expected based on donors’ publicly declared support for community involvement in NGO project 
(e.g. Mansuri and Rao 2012), we find no evidence to confirm that NGOs receive a significant and 
positive return (r) on involving the community in their projects. We therefore conclude that a 
pure lump sum contract (with r set to 0) is the most apt description of the typical relationship 
between community participation and revenues. 
To confirm the sign and gauge the magnitude of 𝑏(𝑝𝑖) under a lump sum payment 
scenario, we attempt an empirical estimation of the algorithm for beneficiary welfare presented in 
Section 2 earlier:  
𝑊 =  𝑏(𝑝𝑖) + 𝑣(𝑒𝑖), 
where W represents beneficiary welfare and effective project expenditure, 𝑒𝑖 , is proxied via a 
range of NGO input variables, the human capital of the manager and community needs.  The 
analysis in Section 2 suggests that under the lump sum payment scenario the selfishness 
parameter, 𝜃𝑖, will negatively affect the likelihood of an NGO engaging in community 
participation, 𝑝𝑖 , with this effect dependent on the empirically unobserved 
𝑐
𝛽
 term (recall 
Observation 1 and equation (15) above).  It also postulates that greater selfishness will reduce 
beneficiary welfare by reducing project expenditure (Observation 1).  Hence we add the 
selfishness parameter to our list of expenditure proxies.  
Our next step is to find a continuously measurable empirical proxy of the beneficiary 
welfare since the latter is not directly observable in itself.  It is notoriously difficult to find 
suitable material indicators to assess the value added by pro-poor development projects.  
Development projects often have numerous aims and objectives, and these are frequently 
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intangible or hard to measure and have time trajectories that are unpredictable.
5
  Instead of a 
material output indicator, therefore, we propose a measure that is an indicator of the subjectively 
perceived beneficiary welfare (see Figure 2 below), as assessed by a group of beneficiaries from 
the community. Confronted with a hypothetical scenario where the NGO was experiencing 
serious financial difficulty, focus group participants from the beneficiary community were asked 
to reach consensus on what share, 𝑠, of a gift (represented by a pile of 100 beans) they would 
allocate to save the NGO in question.  It was explained to community members that the gift could 
also be used for any other community initiative or distributed among members of the community. 
The question tries to capture the perceived utility generated by the organisation, by gauging 
community members’ willingness to pay.  Under our hypothetical scenario, willingness to pay 
can be separated from issues concerning the ability to pay.  Importantly, this perceived utility 
measure also allows comparison across focus areas and organisation types. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
 
It is worth noting that the outcome variable is not dependent on the number of NGOs in a 
particular region.  As part of the structured group interviews with the beneficiaries data was 
collected on all service providers in the area.  In particular beneficiaries were asked to list all 
providers of the service that the NGO reported to be doing.  We found the number of competitors 
varied from 1 to 16 with the majority, 30 percent, facing no competition, and another 21 percent 
from one of two providers.  Regressing this competition variable on the bean count variable we 
found no correlation.  The level of competition did not affect the sharing of the beans. 
We are also encouraged that the focus groups were not dominated by elites: the majority 
of the sample had secondary education, 40 percent, 34 percent had primary education and only 19 
percent had a degree.  When we include these variables in the estimations to control for potential 
bias, they do not alter the findings.  We also found that in the majority of cases the beans were 
decided as a group.  In 17 percent of cases the participants the allocation was determined by 
                                                 
5
  Herman and Renz (2004) discuss the difficulties with selecting performance indicators for nonprofit 
organizations.  It is not always clear whether performance should be judged on a program basis or 
organization-wide.  There are often a number of distinct client and stakeholder types with competing aims 
and needs associated with a nonprofit organization (e.g. beneficiaries, staff members, suppliers, private 
sector funders, government), and it is difficult to make sense of these different voices and claims to derive a 
single indicator of the organization’s performance.  Additionally, comparability is a concern, given the 
variety of activities and aims present in the nonprofit sector.  One of the frequently cited objections to NGO 
project assessments is that less tangible, but vital project aims such as empowerment, social trust and 
changes in attitudes and behavior do not have predictable gestation periods.   
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individual voting.  Again, adding the voting indicator variable does not alter the findings of the 
beneficiary welfare model. 
 We capture variation in the selfishness parameter (𝜃𝑖 in our theoretical analysis) via a 
community focus group question on the perceived altruism of the NGO staff, as reported on a 
Likert scale.  Community members were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that the NGO 
existed to serve the purposes of its own staff rather than to help the community.  As reported in 
Table 1 below, we find that there is a strong and positive relationship between perceived altruism 
and beneficiary welfare, which is robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables for 
managerial traits, the features of the community and the NGO’s characteristics.  We are however 
cognisant of the dangers of contamination across community focus group assessment categories 
(e.g. halo effect) based on the findings of previous studies (e.g. Cooper, 1981; Thorndike, 1920). 
In this setting it is conceivable that the scores across a range of assessment categories are 
reflective mainly of the community’s vague and fuzzy positive or negative sentiment towards the 
NGO. This could create a spurious positive correlation between perceived altruism and the 
willingness to pay measure.  
 As a further check, we use alternative and more exogenous measures of altruism such as 
gender of the manager and also whether the manager had a religious title or role, the share of staff 
members with religious titles/roles and whether the NGO had a religious affiliation to instrument 
our perceived altruism variable (See Table 1).6  The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
fails to reject null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, but the low F-statistic value confirms 
that the instruments are however weak.  Encouragingly, the instrumented variable coefficient 
remains significant when using wider confidence intervals that are robust to weak instruments, as 
suggested by Moreira and Poi (2003).  
 
 Insert Table 1 here. 
 
The histogram of the selfishness variable is shown in Figure 3 below and displays a high 
concentration of observations in the left tail, i.e. a high proportion of NGOs are rated as very 
altruistic.   
 
                                                 
6
  Previous research on this dataset (Fafchamps and Owens, 2009) used both NGO religious affiliation and 
gender of manager as proxies for altruism.  These proxies are motivated by evidence in the literature that 
‘working for God matters’.  Reinikka and Svensson (2010) found that workers and managers of religious 
not-for-profit health care facilities in Uganda have intrinsic motivations to serve poor people.  Using the 
Ugandan dataset Barr and Fafchamps (2006) found that if the manager has a religious title, the NGO is 
more likely to be perceived by the community as altruistic.  
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Insert Figure 3 here. 
 
To allay fears that the asymmetric shape in Figure 3 may be due to framing effects or 
bunching, we ran a tobit model (with assumed lower level censoring) and an ordered probit model 
for the first stage regression of the IV.  If these effects distorted the scale so that most of the 
variation is now located in a small section of the scale, the ordered probit model can help correct 
for this effect by relaxing the assumption that the distances between the categories are equally far 
apart.  If however we are concerned that the skewness to the left was attributable to framing 
effects that caused an underreporting of selfishness that cannot be wholly retrieved because the 
lowest category is 1, a tobit model assuming censoring at the lower bound (i.e. at 1) for the first 
stage can help to correct for such an effect.  In both cases, we find that the selfishness variable 
remains significant.  Unfortunately, we cannot run our IV regressions correcting for weak 
instruments at the same time as these robustness checks to investigate how the Likert scale and 
the concentration of observations to the left/bottom of the distribution may influence our 
estimates.  
We therefore conclude that the positive and significant relationship between altruism and 
beneficiary welfare, reported in Table 1 above, is robust.  The analysis also suggests that 
community participation does not significantly alter beneficiary welfare.  It is plausible that 
community participation only yields economic benefits to projects in specific subsectors.  
Alternatively, the variable could be insignificant because it fails to capture the quality dimensions 
of community participation, which could be an essential determinant of the approach’s impact.  
The negative and significant coefficient on number of staff members could resonate with 
work that suggests that larger organizations tend to be less agile and less responsive (Haveman, 
1993). Similarly the negative and significant coefficient on microfinance NGOs may reflect 
perceptions that microfinance NGOs aim to enrich themselves and maximize profits. 
 We are also interested in the relationship between community participation and altruism 
of the organisation.  As shown in Table 2 below, the altruism coefficient is not significant in our 
IV model of community participation.  In our empirical model, we control for a number of NGO 
inputs, managerial characteristics and community need.  In line with intuition, local NGOs and 
NGOs with a higher number of members have higher community involvement levels.  Also, we 
find a positive association between the experience of managers and community participation.  
The analysis also shows that older NGOs and NGO where managers have degrees tend to have 
lower levels of community participation, which could be due to the tendency of donor funding to 
crowd out community funding and distort the orientation of the NGO away from the community 
 21 
 
and towards the establishment of an experienced and skilled bureaucracy to serve the donor 
(Fafchamps and Owens, 2009).  Contrary to what one would have hoped, we find that community 
participation tends to be significantly lower in poor communities. 
 
 Insert Table 2 here. 
 
The insignificant coefficient on the selfishness variable in the community participation 
model is interpreted as evidence that the level of participation implemented by an NGO does not 
appear to vary appreciably with the extent of its selfishness, even though Figure 1 above shows 
that there is a fair degree of variation in the underlying variable – even in its raw format prior to 
instrumentation.
7
 
 Recall now equation (15) above.  Our regression results lead us to conclude that  
𝑐
𝛽
≅ 0.  
As already discussed in Section 2, we therefore have theoretical grounds for inferring that all 
NGOs in our data-set are broadly implementing the optimal level of participation.  Thus, our 
theoretical analysis provides us a priori reasons for rejecting the case for switching to a 
participation subsidy for the group of NGOs covered in our data-set.    
To summarize, our empirical findings lead us to conclude that: (a) a pure lump-sum 
contract appears to be the most apt description for the revenue arrangements of the typical NGO 
in our data-set, and (b) recalling equation (15) above, 
𝑐
𝛽
≅ 0.  As already discussed in Section 2.3, 
we therefore have theoretical grounds for rejecting the case for providing a participation subsidy 
to the group of NGOs covered in our data-set.    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
  While controlling for a set of covariate that may define the type of NGO we also included interaction 
terms to see whether community participation made a difference within particular types of NGOs.  We 
looked at interaction effects with a range of indicators, including altruism and community participation and 
found none to be significant.  
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Figure 1: Histogram of community participation index 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of willingness to pay 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Histogram of selfishness variable 
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Table 1: Empirical model of beneficiary welfare 
 
Coef. P>|t| 
NGO characteristics     
NGO staff described as selfish -0.2089 0.081 
Community participation index -0.0531 0.332 
Ratio of revenue to members 0.0412 0.06 
Log of number of members 0.0390 0.131 
Log of staff members -0.0765 0.093 
Proportion of staff members that has professional qualification -0.1752 0.179 
Log of years of NGO existence 0.0380 0.486 
Describes activities as community development -0.0208 0.848 
Microfinance activities -0.1531 0.084 
Local NGO? 0.1692 0.381 
Community need     
Index of community capabilities (higher = more assets) -0.0131 0.525 
Availability of basic infrastructure -0.0176 0.839 
Manager characteristics     
Log of years of manager experience 0.0171 0.792 
Manager has a degree -0.1878 0.139 
Constant 1.0701 0.044 
Observations 124 
Sargan test 1.6942 (p = 0.6382) 
Wu-Hausman test 2.8117  (p = 0.0965) 
 
Table 2: Empirical model of community participation 
NGO characteristics Coef. P>|t| 
NGO staff described as selfish -0.304 0.405 
Ratio of revenue to members 0.009 0.894 
Log of years of NGO existence -0.562 0.008 
Log of number of members 0.214 0.010 
Log of number of staff  0.047 0.727 
Proportion of staff with professional qualifications 0.459 0.223 
Specialise in microcredit -0.062 0.813 
Local NGO? 0.978 0.024 
Manager characteristics   
Manager has degree -0.541 0.100 
Log of years of manager experience 0.385 0.049 
Community characteristics   
Index of community capabilities (higher = more assets) 0.111 0.047 
Constant 4.112 0.003 
Observations 129 
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5.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined the theoretical or a priori case for donors subsidizing NGOs to increase 
community participation.  We have shown that such a case is not robust in general.  Thus, making 
expansions in community participation an objective of donor policy, and applying explicit 
financial inducements to achieve this objective, may end up generating perverse welfare 
consequences.  Conversely, eliminating community participation from the set of conditions for 
funding an NGO may improve beneficiary welfare.  We have offered evidence from the NGO 
sector in Uganda that operationalizes our theoretical conclusions.  Specifically, we failed to find a 
statistically robust relationship between the degree of community participation implemented and 
the extent of NGO selfishness, with the latter measured by the stated perceptions of client 
communities. Our theoretical conclusions lead us to interpret this as a rejection of the case for 
providing a participation subsidy to the group of NGOs covered in our data-set.    
 Bougheas et al. (2007) show, in the general context of charitable transfers, how 
conditions imposed by donors may be inefficient, yet persist indefinitely.  Our analysis suggests 
that the current popularity of community participation as a donor conditionality, in the context of 
developmental aid channelled through NGOs, may possibly constitute an example of this 
phenomenon.  More discriminating assessment of the benefits and costs of community 
participation as a donor conditionality, in alternative theoretical and empirical contexts, is 
evidently called for in light of this paper.  Burger et al. (2014) discuss the problem of regulating 
NGOs by making grants to them conditional on their spending at least some pre-determined 
proportion of revenue on direct project related expenses.  An analogous exercise, carried out in 
the context of a threshold level of community participation, may yield useful policy-relevant 
insights. 
 Lastly, in line with much of the existing empirical literature, the nature of the 
'community' that is supposed to 'participate' has been left unexplored in our analysis.  Dasgupta 
and Kanbur (2011, 2007, 2005) have shown how differences in patterns of voluntary provision of 
public goods crucially affect inequality, distributive tensions and poverty levels, both within and 
across communities.  It is conceivable that such differences, by influencing the costs of 
consensus-building within a community, may also have a bearing on whether greater community 
participation leads to substantial improvements in decision-making or simply creates blocking 
coalitions.  Relatedly, Platteau and Abraham (2002) and Platteau and Gaspart (2003) have 
discussed how existing power relations within a community may cause attempts at ensuring 
participatory development to generate perverse consequences.  How the efficacy of donor-
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mandated community participation is affected by various aspects of the internal organization of a 
community is an issue that would merit extensive examination in future research.  
Lastly, it should be emphasised that, while the insignificance of the community 
participation variable cautions against a ‘magic bullet’ view of the economic contribution of the 
participatory approach to poverty alleviation projects, it does not address the extra-economic (or, 
indeed, non-welfaristic) case for community participation.  The framework adopted in this study 
is one of standard welfare-theoretic analysis: we do not consider non-welfaristic (implicitly, 
freedom or rights-based) 'social empowerment' justifications for the participatory approach.  
Whether such justifications may possibly constitute a theoretically coherent alternative case for 
the participatory approach is a question that deserves independent in-depth investigation.  
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptives of regression variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Willingness to pay 0.62 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Poverty index 0.00 2.09 -5.07 3.24 
Ln of ratio of revenue to members 7.11 3.60 0.18 14.98 
Ln of  years of experience for manager 2.11 0.67 0.69 3.71 
Ln of years of existence for NGO 1.94 0.89 0.00 3.91 
Ln of number of members 4.04 2.91 0.00 8.70 
Community participation index 4.94 1.51 0.00 7.00 
Basic infrastructure 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Ln of number of staff members 3.10 0.99 1.39 5.99 
Specialise in community development 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Specialise in microcredit 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Local NGO? 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Manager has degree 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Proportion of staff with professional 
qualification 0.42 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Selfishness index 1.89 1.34 1.00 5.00 
Male manager 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Does the NGO have a religious affiliation? 0.37 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Does the manager hold a religious title? 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Proportion of staff classified as religious 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.98 
 
 
